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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KATHE HOMER,
Plaintiff-Respondent
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
vs
Docket No. 890689-CA
STEPHEN HOMER,
Defendant-Appellant

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(c) , Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Appellant submits the following
Reply Brief.
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Plaintiff-Respondent (Kathe Homer)
is designated herein as "Ms Homer"; the Defendant-Appellant
(Stephen Homer) as "Mr Homer".
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
I
THE APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND APPEAL
Ms Homer asserts in her brief [pp. 6-8]

that the brief

of Mr Homer fails to comply with the Rules, in that it fails
to correlate the assertions

therein to the Record. Those

statements are merely a ruse to sidetrack

the Court from

examining the meritorious issues raised in this appeal.
Ms Homer's brief fails to identify even one particular
where the "facts" or other

issues, as stated in Mr Homer's

brief, are in contravention to "the Record".

The

issues

raised

by

Mr

Homer

are

not

factually-intensive, but rather are more "legal": these legal
issues are evident

from the result, as evidenced

decree and the findings
referred

as

required

the

(signed and unsigned) , which were

to by his brief and

Addendum,

by

by

which were

the

Rules. The

included

in the

Addendum

also

contained significant portions of the Transcript of Trial and
Exhibits on some major factual issues.
References to the Record
simply

not

dispositive

as

or the lack thereof

far

as

Mr

Homer's

are

appeal

is

concerned. The major thrust of his appeal is that there was
insufficient findings made by the trial court concerning such
"equitable" issues as alimony.
Ms Homer's brief

[pp. 6-8]

claiming such is an unwarranted

is critical of his brief,
recitation of his personal

interpretation of "equity". Divorce actions are supposed to
be "equitable". So it is indeed fitting that the thrust of
this

appeal center

around

"equity". His brief

certainly

should champion his interpretation of what is "equitable".
There would never be an appeal in a divorce case the parties
always blandly accepted the the lower court's "definition" of
"equity".
Mr

Homer's

brief

complies

with

the

Rules

and

does

contain the necessary references "to the Record". It is Ms
Homer who, in the evidence presented to the trial court and
in the "findings" prepared by her counsel, who has failed to
comply with the requirements of the law.

II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS
Ms Homer's brief [p. 11] states:
"Evidence before the court established that Mrs.
Homer's expenses totalled $1706.56. (R. 114) 1 "
(Emphasis added.) Her brief then recites portions of Findings
Nos. 14 and 16, which indicated that Ms Homer had a monthly
income of $1673.
If

her

"margin"

expenses

(between

were

her

$1706.56

earnings

per

without

month,

then

her

alimony

and

her

expenses) is less than $34 per month. WHY THEN IS THE MONTHLY
ALIMONY AWARD $150?
Her monthly
claimed

expenses of $1706.58 included amounts she

to pay for the parties' minor child, Melissa! Mr

Homer was ordered
"child

support"

available

to pay
and

"revenue"

in excess of $400 per month as

"child
is

care

expenses".

in excess of

$2,073

Thus,

and

she

her
has

expenses of $1706 per month. She shouldn't need alimony on
top of that!
The trial court's brief "findings" certainly do not
resolve

what

should

be obvious

from

simple

arithmetic;

indeed, the "finding" is contrary to the evidence, as claimed
by Ms Homer's own brief.
The

trial

court's

Finding

[#16]

makes

no

specific

reference to her monthly expenses, makes no reference to her
standard of living, and is similarly devoid of any reference
to the potential of her becoming a "public charge".
1

Actually, the $1706.58 amount is found on Page 112
114
of the Record, at ADDENDUM Al, herein.

not

This Court has held it is "reversible error" for the
trial court to fail to enter specific findings concerning the
issues raised by an alimony award. The trial court must make
findings on all material issues and those findings must be
sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts
to reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusions
on each factual issue presented. Marchant vs Marchant, 743
P.2d 199 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
The

issue

of

Ms

Homer's

"need"

for

alimony

was

vigorously contested at all stages of this action. In light
of the foregoing, this Court cannot determine the steps the
trial court took to reach its conclusion.

As with Marchant,

the findings entered by the trial court are insufficient to
support an award of permanent alimony. Ms Homer's appellate
counsel has conveniently chosen to overlook and ignore those
two cases and the principles for which they stand.
Ill
ALIMONY IN A NO-FAULT DIVORCE
This

action

was

filed

as

a

"no

fault"

(i.e.

"irreconcilable differences") divorce under the statutory
amendments recently adopted by the 1987 Legislature.
In Haumont vs Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, (Utah Court of
Appeals 1990) , this Court correctly noted that "no fault need
be proven or inferred" (Id. at 427) in an action such as
this. Haumont did not address the issue of the award of
alimony in the "no fault" context, but rather reversed and
remanded due to the trial court's failure to enter sufficient
findings. Thus, this case is a case of first impression for

this Court.
The

"old"

cases

cited

by

Ms

Homer

in

her

brief

interpretting divorce actions NOT in a "no fault" context
ought

to be

limited

to

their

specific

facts

and

law.

Furthermore, we are in the 1990s: a time when the economic
opportunities for women are many times what they were when
those traditional "alimony" cases were developed. It is time
to abandon those archaic concepts, particularly in the case
of an ex-wife totally able to support herself.
The Legislature, consistent with the national trend of
"throw-away marriages" has adopted the "no fault" concept.
The purpose thereof was to make divorce easier. That arguably
laudible will not be met if the courts continue to award
alimony in a "no fault" context; the parties will still fight
over that. As judged from the number of appeals concerning
that singular issue and the number of divorce modifications
in which its termination is sought, the men appear not to
enjoy

paying

alimony;

that

situation

is

going

to be

aggravated when the divorce was to be "no fault". If it is
nobody's "fault", then why she the man be forced to pay his
ex-wife? If the award of alimony is not to be characterized
as a "punishment" (for the paying husband) or a "reward" (for
the receiving wife), then there is not logical explanation
for routinely denying the award of permanent alimony in
so-called

"short-term" marriages, while awarding

"long-term" marriages. The recipient spouse

it in

even in a

"short-term" marrriage might have become just as "accustomed
to that standard of living". And after the marriage, she

might just as likely to become a "public charge".
Haumont recognizes the principle that nno fault is to be
inferred", an award of alimony

for the ostensible purpose

of enabling the recipient spouse (Ms Homer) to "continue, as
nearly as possible,
accustomed"

in the lifestyle to which she has become

which has the exact opposite effect on Mr

Homer: contrary to whatever the courts as bystanders to the
transaction may have characterized it in the past, it's a
penalty.

Since it is she that is now "breaking the marital

contract" , it should be he-

the non-breaching party

who

ought to be entitled to "the lifestyle at which he has become
accustomed".
Obviously,

the

Court

is placed

in

the

unenviable

position of, as one commentator put it, "dividing a single
blanket to cover two beds."
The

instant

case

is dissimilar

to

that

situation

presented in Martinez vs Martinez, 754 P.2d 59 (Utah Court of
Appeals,

1988).

Ms

Homer

is

a

college-graduate

with

post-graduate education, employed in a full-time job in her
own chosen career, with full medical and retirement benefits,
living in the home that she purchased prior to the marriage
when she was receiving no alimony from her previous husband.
She claims to be "entitled" to alimony, strictly on the basis
of Mr Homer's "ability to pay it".

Ms Homer cites [p. 12] to the case of Davis vs Davis,
749 P.2d 647 (Utah Supreme Court 1988), as authority for an
award of "permanent alimony" in a "long-term marriage". Davis
involved a 13-year marriage: almost TWICE AS LONG as the
instant relationship terminated at 7 years. And in Davis, Mr
Davis had after-alimony annual income approaching $100,000.
Davis is more applicable to Ms Homer in this case for
the issues described

by Justice Howe in his concurring

opinion:
She is . . . healthy, and well-educated. She
has worked and continues to work full-time. She
received a large cash settlement at the time of the
divorce. . ., as well as substantial amounts of
property. She was not left with any indebtedness
incurred during the marriage, . . . Assuming she
continues to [work] and invests the proceeds of the
settlement, she is in a strong financial position
without additional support from plaintiff.
. . .

Thus, the district court's award of permanent
alimony was an abuse of discretion when reviewed
under the criteria established by this Court. This
is not the type of situation where an award of
permanent alimony, or any alimony whatsoever, is
warranted.
749 P.2d at 650 (Justice Howe, concurring and dissenting).
Emphasis added.
Assuming that a major element necessary for an award of
permanent alimony is the "standard of living issue enjoyed by
the spouse during marriage", that criteria should not be
followed in a "no fault" case. An award of alimony in a "no
fault" case encourages the break-up of the marital and family
relationships: the spouse gets to live in the "standard of
living to which she has become accustomed, but without making
the agreed-upon contributions or commitment which supposedly
were the basis of the marital relationship. Such "judicial

logic" conflicts with the expressed "public policy" of Utah:
"to

take

reasonable

measures

to

preserve

marriages,

particularly where minor children are involved." Section
30-3-11.1, Utah Code.
It is ironic that in a state which prides itself
in the expressed

legislative

policy

as well as

attitudes of the majority of its people

both
in the

in the integrity of

families and the institution of marriage, judicial policies
are applied

in a fashion which encourage divorce, thus

undermining those policies.
Secondly, the award of permanent alimony in this case
raises issues of "constitutional" dimension. The relatively
new "no fault" character

of this action highlights and

refines the "constitutional" issues, which Ms Homer's brief
(pp.

9-10)

reference

does
that

not even
Mr

Homer's

address. Except

for

"constitutional"

a brief
issue

is

"unsupportable" (p. 9 of Ms Homer's brief), she choses not
even to address this issue which apparently has never been
raised, probably due to the recent vintage of the "no-fault"
statute.
A major element in the "alimony" analysis is the "keep
the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge" issue. In
Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 97 LEd2d
677, 107 SCt 3141 (1987), the United States Supreme Court
ruled

that

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

prevented

state

government from "taking private property for public use"
without just compensation. Certainly Nollan is not a "divorce
case", but the constitutional principle applies:

"private

property" (from Mr Homer's future earnings) cannot be "taken
for public use" (for the purpose of insuring that Ms Homer
does not become a "public charge")! Those principles are
consistent with the ruling in Colman vs Utah State Land
Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990), interpretting
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution: "Private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation." Those two cases raise serious questions
as

to

the

"constitutionality"

especially a "no fault" divorce

of

any

alimony

award,

alimony award. That this

"constitutional" issue has not been previously addressed by
the appellate courts should not prevent Mr Homer from now
litigating it.
IV
THE CHILD SUPPORT ISSUES
A.

The "dependency exemption" under federal tax law

Ms Homer's brief [p. 14] implies that the "dependency
exemption" allowed under Section 152 of the federal Internal
Revenue Code was a major issue which was actively litigated
and that he "lost" the fight in the trial court below for the
"dependency exemption". Later her brief [p. 15] states

that

this issue is raised for the first time on appeal. Such
mutually-inconsistent statements are both incorrect.
The "dependency exemption", per se, was not mentioned in
the course of the proceedings; however, the income tax
consequences attendant to the custody award were mentioned at
trial. Mr Homer's position was not to seek

the "dependency

exemption." It was beneficial to the parties jointly, and

especially

Ms

Homer,

that

she

be

entitled

to

keep

the

"dependancy exemption" under federal law, so as to enable her
to file income taxes in even a lower "tax bracket" (i.e.
"head of household") than would have been the case is she had
to

file

merely

as

"single".

However,

the

"income

tax

consequences" were addressed by Mr Homer. At page 160 of the
Transcript of the Trial, he

in response to inquiry as to

why the child support amount should be stated to be less than
the amount specified in the "guidelines"

stated:

MR. HOMER:
"Furthermore the schedules and the
process do not take into account the custody issue
and the tax consequences attendant to the parties
of who ends up with custody. And I think that
should be taken into account in an equitable
distribution of the assets and/or the child support
amount that should be awarded."
Transcript of Trial, p. 160. [ADDENDUM A2, herein] Ms Homer
made no attempt to rebut this statement.
The specific impact as to the actual effect was sought
to be addressed in the "Supplemental Findings of Fact", as
prepared

by Mr

Homer

and

submitted

to the

trial

court.

Specifically, Proposed Findings # 33, 34, 35 and 36 addressed
this issue, included

in Mr Homer's original Brief at p. A37

of the Addendum.
The filing status and the rates at which the taxes would
be calculated

are "matters of law"

easily determinable

(state

and

federal),

by judicial notice, if necessary

and

for which there is no dispute. Ample factual evidence was
presented to establish the parties 1

incomes. Nevertheless,

inspite of the express request to make a "finding" on that
issue, the trial court refused, tersely stating:

The Court has also received and reviewed the
"Supplemental Findings of Fact", prepared by
defendant. The Court will not execute those
proposed findings as they do not accurately reflect
the Court's ruling in it's [sic] memorandum
decision, and because much of the material
contained in the "Supplemental Findings of Fact" is
not relevant, and appears to be an attempt by
defendant to relitigate the case.
[Trial Court's October 26, 1989, memoradum decision, at p.
268 of the Record; at p. A4 of Appellant's original brief.]
In Motes vs Motes, 786 P.2d

232, 121 Utah Advance

Reports 54 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989), this Court declared
that the trial court
"must always recognize the financial benefit
accompanying dependency exemption when awarding
alimony and child support."
786 P.2d at 239. Emphasis added. The "must always recognize"
standard imposed upon the trial court is even stronger than a
"judicial notice" standard. The trial court failed to do
this,

even when Mr Homer expressly called it out in his

testimony.
Even when the issue was specifically called out to the
trial court in the "Supplemental Findings", the trial court
refused to sign the "findings"

not because they were not

accurate, but because (1) they were not included in the trial
court's earlier Memorandum Decision, (2) were irrelevant, or
(3) were an attempt to relitigate the case.
The trial court's original (July 31, 1989) Memorandum
Decision makes absolutely no reference to any income tax
consequences. The fact that the trial court omits to dispose
of an issue cannot be the basis for refusing to consider it,
particularly when it is brought to its attention, especially

when the Court of Appeals has said that "the trial court must
always recognize" the tax consequences. If the reason for the
trial court's reticence to sign Supplemental Findings ##
33-36

was

that

such

" rel i t igated"

the

case,

such

a

characterization is perhaps the highest compliment as to the
integrity and accuracy of that finding. The purpose of the
findings
"losing"

including "Supplemental Findings" prepared by the
party

are

to enable

the appellate

court

to

determine the thought processes of the trial judge. The trial
judge cannot refuse to sign a finding merely because it
didn't fit into his original disposition of the case or he
felt it was "irrelevant".
Contrary to the assertions of Ms Homer's brief [p. 14] ,
the child support "guidelines" (tables) DO NOT take into
account the income tax consequences which come from the
custody award. The "guidelines" couldn't take those tax
consequences into account, as the "guidelines" themselves are
"CUSTODY-NEUTRAL": the calculations as to the monthly support
to be paid by each parent are made using the guidelines
without regard to which parent has custody.
Ms Homer states that the "guidelines" are "adjusted for
FICA, federal and state taxes"; indeed, the statute (Section
78-45-7.14, Utah Code) even says so, although

the word

"adjusted" is unexplained. However, to say that this sentence
overrules the principles announced in Motes is incorrect.
That sentence

refers to the tables as to how

"monthly

combined adjusted gross income" is calculated; its purpose
was to reflect the fact that the Legislature ostensibly

considered the impact of taxes generally when setting the
guidelines. The purpose of the sentence is to insure that the
"gross" income figure

not the "net" income

deductions for FICA and taxes)

(following

will be utilized.

The "taxes" paid by parties

could not be taken into

account because the parties might have differing "marginal
rates" (the rates at which the federal tax bracket jumps from
15% to 28% of taxable income). Because the tables utilize
only a "combined" monthly income/ there could be no taking
into account of

the taxes to be paid, by the parties,

vis-a-vis each other, which was the whole purpose behind the
principles announced in Motes.
The fact that the tax consequences are not taken into
account

can be

mathematical

readily

seen

calculations

by

are

the

instant

adequately

case. The

document

in

Appellant's initial brief and need not be repeated here.
The amount by which Ms Homer's income taxes are reduced
(which is the same amount by which Mr Homer's income taxes
are increased) should be equitably divided, in the same
manner as the child support obligation is divided.
Instead, the trial court ignored the issue presented to
it. Motes says it "must always be considered". If Ms Homer
does not want the "child support amount" to be equitably
reduced to take into account those tax consequences, then she
ought to be forced to give up the "dependency exemption" as
Motes allows.

Motes is exactly applicable to the instant situation,
where Mr Homer

(the non-custodial parent) has the "higher

income" and provides "the majority of the support".
B. Child support paid for children of previous marriage
Mr Homer paid and continues to pay $300 "child support"
for children of a previous marriage, even though only $200
was "ordered" for two children. This is not merely an issue
of following the statute, as she suggests in her brief [p.
16].2

The statute allows the trial court "discretion" in

taking into account payments which are less than what was
ordered, equity would demand
for

paying

more

that Mr Homer be given credit

a situation

the Legislature

certainly

didn 1 t envision.
It is certainly inequitable for Ms Homer to contest this
point,

since

she's

claiming

their

child

(Melissa)

is

entitled to $351.75 worth of support from Mr Homer, but that
his other children from a previous marriage are only worth
$100 each. That inequity is illustrated by the fact that the
net impact to her is a mere $6 per month: the actual costs of
providing

for Melissa are not increased or decreased

ONE

PENNY by any of this. No, the focus is whether there's a
signed paper in a dusty court file somewhere. If there is,
then she'll take the $6 less per month.

2

One can but wonder what her position would be if Mr Homer did
NOT PAY the court-ordered $200. Would she thus argue for an
increase in the child-support to be paid for Melissa, because
of his increased "adjusted income"?
1 A

Divorce
support

actions

including

the

award

of

child

are "equitable". Equity does what ought to be done;

in close cases, "equity" will overrule "law". The policy of
this state should not be to discourage non-custodial parents
from PAYING MORE CHILD SUPPORT than is ordered, because of
hypertechnical adherence to a statute. The "policy" of the
state be such that the "guidelines" are that and that the
trial

judges

have

"discretion"

for

such

cases, which

discretion ought to be followed to advance the obvious goals
of the statute.
Indeed, the trial court did abuse that discretion.
C.

The "child care expenses" component

Concerning the

the "child care expenses" component of

the child support award, Ms Homer's

brief [p. 16] states

that to "have even raised this issue on appeal without doing
basic research into the law is an abuse of the appellate
process." Such is an absolute misrepresentation of law and
fact!
This case was tried in the summer of 1989. The decree
was finally signed in October 1989. The appeal was filed in
November and the issues on appeal were established through
the "Docketing Statement", filed with the Court in December
1989. The Docketing Statement preserved the "child care
expenses" issue

which had been argued unsuccessfully to the

trial court. Mr Homer's brief addressed the issue.

Section 78-45-7.16 3 , Utah Code, which arguably renders
moot

this

particular

issue,

was

amended

by

the

1990

Leg islature pursuant to H.B. 103! The 1990 Edition of the
Utah Code books
amendment

could

published by Michie Company
be

publicly-determined,

available until August 1990

by which this
were

not

even

AFTER Mr Homer's Appellant's

Brief was written and filedl
His position is certainly justified; it is not an "abuse
of the appellate process". On the contrary, his position on
the point seems to be well taken, as the Legislature adopted
the position he sought, but was refused by the trial court,
even when it was specifically called to his attention. In
pursuing his appeal, he certainly could not predict that the
Legislature would, in a subsequent year, adopt legislation
addressing the very situation he felt inequitable.

3

Section 78-45-7.16, arfcapiled by the 1990 Legislature AFTER
THIS APPEAL WAS FILED, now reads:
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable
work-related child care costs actually incurred on behalf of
the dependent children of the parents shall be specified as a
separate monthly amount in the order.
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount specified in
the order ceases to be incurred, the obligor may suspend
making monthly payment of that expense while it is not being
incurred, without obtaining a modification of the child
support order.
Emphasis added.
16

Ms Homer's brief [p. 17] notes that the "worksheet" and
the "findings" and "conclusions" call out the "child care
expenses" component and that Mr Homer can be excused from
paying

that

incurred.

component

While

there

when

those

still

may

costs
be

are

a problem

no

longer

with

the

"decree" (which includes the amount, without actually saying
so

which was the whole point of the appeal), Mr Homer is

willing to concede this issue is now moot and that pursuant
to the provisions of Rule 37(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the Appellant suggests4

that in light of the 1990

legislative amendments to Section 78-45-7.16, Utah Code, the
issues raised

in POINT VII of APPELLANT'S BRIEF [pp. 43-45]

are "moot" and that no dispute thereon

is presented. The

Appellant submits herewith a "Suggestion of Mootness", in the
form contained in ADDENDUM A3, hereto.
V
DIVISION OF THE PENSION BENEFITS
A.

The "pension" account

Contrary to Ms Homer's assertion [p. 18 of her brief],
Mr Homer has NEVER, NEVER
this appeal
4

either in the trial court or in

claimed that the "pension" account (adopted by

Pursuant to Rule 37, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ms
Homer's counsel has a "duty . . . at all times during the
course of an appeal" to inform the court of any circumstances
which have transpired subsequent to the filing of the appeal
which would render moot one or more of the issues raised.
That party shall "forthwith advise" the appellate court
thereon. It is interesting that Ms Homer's counsel is so
quick and critical (by using terms like "abuse of the
judicial process") of Mr Homer's failure to predict the
legislative will, when arguably much time and effort might
have been saved had she notified the Court and Mr Homer of
the amendments to 78-45-7.16, which became effective 23 April
1990, in a timely manner.

his employer as a substitute

for federal social security

coverage) was "exempt from division" by the divorce court.
This is NOT an issue of a statute

(or lack thereof) which

prevents the "division" of the account upon divorce. The
issue is one of simple equity.
The court should take into account the "penalty" which
will be imposed upon him by reason of the federal

"Windfall

Elimination Provision", which WILL reduce his federal social
security benefits in the future. Randy Marchant, an employee
of the social security administration, testified as to the
"Windfall Elimination Provision". [TRANSCRIPT at pp. 86-91,
contained

in the ADDENDUM

(A64 thru A69)

to Mr

Homer's

original brief.]
The "Windfall Elimination Provision" has been on

the

books since 1983; it was adopted by Congress for the specific
purpose

of

discouraging

the

exodus

of

state

and

local

government employees to ''private plans" in lieu of social
security, as they were then

but no longer

allowed to do.

The fact that the "Provision" has no present impact is of no
consequence

to the analysis; it is there now and, given

Congress1 seemingly-apparent intent to adopt legislation to
include everyone in the social security system, the Provision
will be around permanently.
To quote from Ms Homer's own brief

[p. 23, citing to

Woodward vs Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982):
In Englert vs Englert we emphasized the equitable
nature of proceedings dealing with family, pointing
out that the court may take into consideration all
of the pertinent circumstances.

1R

Id. at 432. Citations omitted. Emphasis added.
federal

law

(denying

employment)
Provision

and

the

should

her
impact

have

benefits
of

been

by

reason

the Windfall
one

Indeed, the

of

of

his

Elimination

the

"pertinent

circumstances" which the trial court took into account in
making an "equitable" distribution. The trial court
its eyes

to

the

issue

merely

pulled

out

closing

the sword

of

justice and divided the baby in equal halvesl
B.

Set-off for expenses of step-children

Contrary to the assertions of Ms Homer's brief [p. 23] ,
taking into account contributions to the living expenses of
step children will not "completely negate" the statutory duty
of a step-parent to support stepchildren; it will further
that policy.
If

such

contributions

are

taken

into

account,

step-parents will be more willing to make those contributions
for those children, knowing that if there is a divorce, the
assets will be "equitably" adjusted. If Ms Homer's position
should prevail (that there be no set-off), then persons will
be reluctant to make those expenses. Instead, the step-parent
will be motivated to "hoard" his monies against the time when
the

divorce

announces

occurs,

particularly

as Ms Homer did

when

one

party

that she will file for divorce

three years in the future (1987) , which she did! [TRANSCRIPT
at p. 165-166, contained
original brief.]

in ADDENDUM A70-A71 of Mr Homer's

In Martinez vs Martinez, 754 P.2d 59 (Utah Court of
Appeals, 1988),

Mrs Martinez was under the same "statutory

duty" to support her husband. Yet on the demise of her
marriage, she was entitled to "equitable restitution" for the
investment she had made. Mr Homer is merely asking for the
same thing: not in terms of alimony as was awarded to Mrs
Martinez, but rather as an "offset" against her claim in a
share of his retirement accounts

the single asset of any

signficant value.
C.

Date of valuation of retirement account assets

Ms Homer1s brief fails to even respond to the numerous
cases cited for the proposition that the retirement assets
ought to be valued as of the date the action was filed. It is
on that date that Ms Homer ceased to be a marital "partner".
She should now not be heard to criticise of utilization of
that date.
Ms Homer's citation [p. 22] of Jense vs Jense, 784 P.2d
1249 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989), is clearly erroneous.
Jense involved a post-decree request for modification

on

the basis that property values in the agreed-upon settlement
had not materialized. Jense doesn't even discuss the "general
rule" as to the date of property valuation.
In any event, those cases which might have been cited
for that general rule involve either (1) property which it is
difficult to obtain a precise value on, particularly in the
past and/or (2) a relatively short time between the filing
for the divorce and its ultimate disposition. Mr Homer is
merely asking for a common-sense refinement to that general
on

rule in cases such as this where the increase in value occurs
because of his continued post-filing contributions.
Although the "general rule" might be to the contrary,
the application of the earlier valuation date in "retirement"
account cases such as this is meritorious. First, it does not
reward one party

at the expense the other

by dragging out

the litigation. And even if such was not intentional, she
still chose to terminate the "marital partnership" as of the
earlier date. Secondly, such an approach would be consistent
with the stated policy of encouraging the "preservation" of
the marriage, particularly when minor children are involved.
Ms Homer's brief [pp. 21-22]

counters his arguments by

quoting the trial court's analysis and disposition of this
issue. However, when examined, the trial court's approach

is

contradictory to the "policy", is contrary to the law, and
even contradicts itself. The trial court wrote:
Had the Defendant wished to limit the plaintiff's
interest in payments made to retirement programs
during the pendency of this litigation, he could
have moved for a bifurcated proceeding, and could
likely have ended the marriage shortly after the
action was filed. Plaintiff is entitled to a
percentage of whatever benefits were accrued during
the time of entry into the marriage, and final
termination of the marriage through this divorce
action.
The better

and certainly more "equitable" (both in terms of

"fairness" and just common sense)

approach would

have been

something along the lines of "if Plaintiff had wanted an
interest

in

the

Defendant's

retirement

programs,

she

shouldn't have filed for divorce, kicked him out and ceased
being the marital 'partner' she originally contracted to be."

There is nothing in the statutes which even describe,
let alone provide for this questionable practice of having a
"bifurcated hearing" to which the trial judge referred. The
defendant-spouse is forced to likewise file (or at least move
with dispatch to the divorce, lest the spouse continue to
leech from his personal earnings and benefits) for divorce.
Such certainly is contrary to the legislative policy! Indeed,
it is time for that policy to be changed, as has been done in
many other states.
The trial court implies
"bifurcated proceeding"

through its reference to the

that the assets would have been

valued and divided as of the earlier date, even though the
property distribution portion of the "bifurcated hearing"
would be held at a later time: in this case, two years laterl
That simply doesn't make sense. First, the bifurcated hearing
is not provided for in the statute; secondly, to force the
defending party to also file (or at least seek the divorce
quickly) is contrary to the public policy described; and
thirdly, it is conceptually impossible
contrary to the statute

or as a minimum,

for the court to enter the divorce

decree and yet fail to resolve the outstanding property
distribution issues.
Indeed, the trial court 1 s ruling is inconsistent with
itself. It implies that the trial court would have valued and
divided

the

assets

as

of

the

earlier

mysterious "bifurcated hearing" been held

date

had

the

and yet goes on

to say that she'd be "entitled" to a percentage of "whatever
retirement benefits were accrued during the time of entry
22

into the marriage and final termination of the marriage
through this action." Such an analysis totally ignores the
evidence before the court: not necessary testimonial evidence
presented at trial, but rather the documentary evidence in
the court file itself, to the effect that she has, in fact
terminated the marriage!
If such "bifurcated" proceedings are allowed, then such
should come from the Legislature, in expressed terms.
They should not come by judicial decision or local court
practice, particularly when such has an effect so contrary to
the public policy of the this state.

Respectfully submitted this 29th day of October, 1990.

Defendant-Appellant Pro Se
CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused four copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S REPY BRIEF to be hand-delived to the office of Ms
Helen E Christian, Attorney at Law, 48 Post Office Place,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this 29th day of October, 1990.

Husband
Rent or mortgage payments (residence)
Real property taxes (residence)
Real property insurance (residence)
Maintenance (residence)
Food and household supplies
Utilities including water, elec, gas & heat
Telephone
Laundry and c l e a n i n g
Clothing
Medical
Dental
I n s u r a n c e ( l i f e , h e a l t h , a c c i d e n t , comprehensive
disability)
Exclude p a y r o l l deducted
C h i l d Care
Payment of child/spousal support re prior
marriage
School
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations,
travel, recreation)
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts,
donations, including tithing)
Transportation (other than automobile)
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance
Auto payments
Installment payments (insert total and attach
itemized schedule if not fully set forth in (d)
Other expenses (insert total and specify on a
attached sheet Melissa/$30.00 violin.
$18.00 dance
TOTAL EXPENSES

Wife
602.00
30.00
300.00
190.%
40.00
21.00
25.00
10.00
10,00
108.00
10.00

40.00
1^5.00
105.00

60.00
1,706.56

I d e c l a r e under p e n a l t y of p e r j u r y t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g , i n c l u d i n g
a t t a c h m e n t s a r e t r u e and c o r r e c t and t h a t t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n was
e x e c u t e d on t h e ^)H^3 day of
May
, 1989, a t

uu

any

£TU

a t t o r n e y S i g n a t u r e 1/
P a r t y ' s Signature
( P l a i n t i f f &XX2SXgmx&CH]B3
KATHE HOMER
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, Attorney a t Law
BRING TO THE HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION
NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO BOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS,
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS.
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160
1

that —

2

interesting that for seven years $115 was enough, for

3

seven years $200 for Kirk and Daniel.

4

It doesn't cost that much.

MR. JOHNSON:

5

THE COURT:

I will sustain the objection.

Just

stick to the facts per the question that was asked.
TNESS:

8
9

Judge, I object.

It's not responsive.

6
7

I find it

As the father of Melissa and havinq

resided in the home as being a noncustodial parent who

10

visits her, and I am familiar with the living

11

arrangements and the expenses attendant to those living

12

arrangements, they are not as high as what the schedules

13

would dictate would work out.

14

Furthermore the schedules and the process

15

do not take into account the custody issue and the tax

16

consequences attendant to the parties of who ends up

17

with custody.

18

account in an equitable distribution of the assets

19

and/or the child support amount that should be awarded.

20
21

Q.

And I think that should be taken into

Okay.

Now should she receive half your

retirement?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Why not?

24

A.

In September of f87 Kathy legally called it

25

quits.

She took legal steps to terminate the marriage.

STEPHEN G HOMER
P 0 Box 493
West Jordan, Utah 84084
Telephone 561-14 63
Defendant-Appellant Pro Se
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KATHE HOMER,
Plaintiff-Respondent

]
)

SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS

vs
i
j

STEPHEN HOMER,

Docket No. 890689-CA

]

Defendant-Appellant

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 37 of the Utah
of

Appellate

Procedure,

the

Defendant-Appellant

Rules
hereby

suggests that one of the issues raised in the above-entitled
action

is

moot:

namely,

expenses", as described
Statement"

the

reduction

of

"child

in Paragraph 5.f of the

care

"Docketing

(filed December 1989) and argued under Point VII

of Appellant's Brief [pp. 4 3 - 4 5 ] , written and filed

before

the 1990 legislative enactments were publicly available.
The mootness on this singular issue arises by reason of
the 1990 Legislature's

adoption of H.B. 106, which

amendments to Section 78-45-7.16, Utah Code, authorizing

made
the

very result which the Appellant sought in that portion of the
appeal.
Based

upon

the

statements

made

on

page

17

of

the

Plaintiff-Respondent's Reply Brief, dated 25 September 1990/

A L N I S C * PKI ^ A

A r^

it is the undersigned's belief that counsel for the opposing
party would concur in this Suggestion of Mootness.
The Court may dispose of the mooted issue as the Court
deems appropr iate.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of October, 1990.

I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing SUGGESTION OF
MOOTNESS to be hand-delivered to the office of Helen E
Christian, Attorney at Law, 48 Post Office Place, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, this 29th day of October, 1990.

